Whistleblowers shouldn’t have to risk their careers for their conscience
UK consultation offers chance for reform, financial rewards for those providing intelligence that assists enforcement bodies.
By Tony McClements
Britain’s whistleblowing laws promise protection but are ineffective. In this context, the latest UK government review, A Consultation on Whistleblowing, is long overdue.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 was intended to protect those exposing wrongdoing and provide remedies against retaliation. It was an admirable ambition but proved totally incapable of protecting those brave enough to stick their heads above the parapet.
The government’s latest consultation offers an opportunity for reform, particularly through financial rewards for individuals providing intelligence that assists law enforcement bodies such as the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
As a former detective who was also a qualified informant handler and appreciates how valuable human intelligence sources can be, I have regularly advocated rewarding whistleblowers. In August 2025, for example, in Should the UK follow the US lead in combating fraud and corruption? I described how “The current legislation is at best insipid, and at worst weak and impractical.”
Britain’s reluctance to reward whistleblowers undermines its ability to expose sophisticated economic crime. Writing for the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in June 2025, my boss, asset recovery lawyer Martin Kenney, observed, “The UK stands at a pivotal juncture in its fight against financial crime.”
An honestly held suspicion that cannot ultimately be substantiated must not be treated as malicious.
Whistleblowing is often a career-ending decision. This exposes the greatest weaknesses in Britain’s whistleblowing framework: the failure to adequately recognise what happens after somebody exposes wrongdoing.
Consider a compliance officer who discovers evidence of money laundering facilitated by senior management. Ideally, that individual would be congratulated for their integrity. In reality, they may find themselves excluded from meetings, overlooked for promotion, relieved of responsibilities, or transferred to a position offering little professional advancement.
An employer determined to neutralize a troublesome whistleblower does not need to dismiss them openly. A succession of apparently legitimate management decisions can achieve the same result (known in employment tribunals as constructive dismissal). Although unlawful, establishing the connection between a disclosure and subsequent professional disadvantage may be impossible.
I highlighted these concerns in a GRIP piece in June 2024 entitled Why compensating UK whistleblowers would be a positive step, questioning whether existing protections adequately addressed the long-term consequences of exposing corporate wrongdoing. Employment litigation cannot necessarily restore professional relationships, reputations, or lost career opportunities.
Perhaps the most insidious consequences arise when whistleblowers seek alternative employment. A financial crime specialist applies for a position with another bank, but the prospective employer receives an informal telephone call from the applicant’s current employer. A suggestion that the applicant was involved in a disruptive investigation or was difficult to manage may be sufficient. That job application fails, ostensibly for entirely unrelated reasons.
For the applicant and former whistleblower, proving the true cause may be practically impossible. This is particularly concerning in specialist sectors, where networks of lawyers, bankers, insolvency practitioners, and compliance professionals are comparatively small. Whistleblower rewards should therefore recognise not only the value of intelligence, but also the potential destruction of professional opportunity.
Proposals include extending protection to self-employed individuals, directors, volunteers, and job applicants; broadening reportable wrongdoing; simplifying disclosures to regulators; and introducing mandatory confidential reporting procedures for employers, potentially backed by civil penalties; although the reluctance to establish a dedicated Office of the Whistleblower is disappointing.
Britain must recognise that courage deserves more than statutory reassurance. Those exposing serious criminality should receive substantial protection, recognition, and financial reward.
I accept that there will be CEOs out there who are concerned that spurious and malicious allegations may be made against themselves or their company. Although that concern deserves consideration, it is hardly an unfamiliar problem for experienced investigators.
Opponents argue that financial incentives could encourage vindictive, malicious, or fabricated accusations. Law enforcement agencies routinely receive intelligence from individuals motivated by financial advantage, personal grievances, or revenge.
For example, “grassing” on drug dealing rivals is a common tactic in that arena, designed to remove competitors and allow the “snout” to seize all the illegal trafficking business. The police response is not to automatically reject that information; it is to investigate it thoroughly.
Malicious whistleblowing offences could be similar to those of wasting police time, contained within the Criminal Law Act 1967. If whistleblowers also had to swear an affidavit when they outlined their allegations, we could potentially add perjury under the 1911 Act (depending on the circumstances). The safeguards can be straightforward, and I would suggest that any new whistleblower legislation encompasses specific offences along the lines of the existing legislation.
But an honestly held suspicion that cannot ultimately be substantiated must not be treated as malicious.
The United States recognised years ago that expecting employees to expose powerful corporate interests without meaningful financial incentives was unrealistic. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can reward eligible whistleblowers with between 10% and 30% of monetary sanctions collected through qualifying enforcement actions.
These are not payments for unsubstantiated allegations. They reward original information contributing to successful enforcement. The commercial logic is compelling. A whistleblower may identify concealed bank accounts, fictitious invoices, intermediary companies, or suspicious transactions that investigators might otherwise spend years uncovering. In international asset recovery, reliable inside intelligence can be invaluable, particularly when tracing proceeds through offshore corporate structures and multiple jurisdictions.
As I write, the Trump administration has announced that it is launching a $25m “Fraud Whistleblower Incentive Program,” intended to reward whistleblowers who report crimes committed against government schemes. The scheme will be administered by the DOJ. Although any such scheme is welcomed, I pause and wonder if these new powers will be wielded across the political spectrum or be more targeted given the US political landscape.
Meanwhile, the UK government’s proposals, following recommendations by Jonathan Fisher KC in the second report from the Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, Fraud in the Digital Age, envisage financial incentives for individuals providing significant, original information leading to successful corporate enforcement.
I wholeheartedly support Fisher’s approach. His argument is straightforward: Rewarding intelligence is an established investigative principle, not an invitation to manufacture allegations. But financial compensation arriving years after an investigation may be insufficient – by which stage a whistleblower could have lost employment, exhausted savings, incurred legal expenses, and suffered irreversible career damage. Britain should consider interim financial assistance for eligible whistleblowers facing demonstrable hardship, alongside substantial final rewards linked to qualifying enforcement outcomes.
There is also an obvious question of fairness. If corporations can obtain credit for cooperation through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, why should individuals whose disclosures exposed the wrongdoing receive no comparable recognition?
However, even though I extoll the US model, a change in administration has brought with it some concerning developments that contradict what was an established ethos of investigating and prosecuting corruption.
Again, I made this point back in October 2022 (for the ACFE), arguing for proper verification and corroboration. A credible reward scheme should require independent assessment of allegations, source credibility checks, authentication of documents, examination of potential conflicts, and rigorous evidential scrutiny.
However, even though I extoll the US model, a change in administration has brought with it some concerning developments that contradict what was an established ethos of investigating and prosecuting corruption.
On February 10, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order pausing enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), pending a policy review. The administration argued that aggressive anti-bribery enforcement disadvantaged American companies competing internationally.
The Executive Order claimed that excessive enforcement: “…actively harms American economic competitiveness and, therefore, national security.”
Translated into less diplomatic language, the argument resembles the familiar excuse that everybody else is doing it, so why shouldn’t we? Gary Kalman, executive director of Transparency International US, described the decision as “a dangerous race to the bottom.”
For international asset recovery practitioners, weaker bribery enforcement creates obvious risks. Corrupt proceeds can travel through multiple jurisdictions, complex company structures, and professional intermediaries. Britain should adopt America’s financial incentives without embracing policies that risk subordinating anti-corruption enforcement to commercial competitiveness.
The current UK government consultation presents an opportunity to transform Britain’s response to economic crime. The arguments advanced by its supporters converge on one essential point: Whistleblowers provide indispensable intelligence, frequently at enormous personal cost. Statutory protection alone is insufficient.
Financial rewards will not eliminate those risks, but they can provide meaningful recognition and compensation. Britain must combine substantial incentives with rigorous safeguards, protection against retaliation, and a genuine commitment to prosecuting corruption.
The fundamental principle is simple. Whistleblowers should not have to choose between their conscience and their career.
